Friday, 6 May 2011

How to Select a Great Domain Name for Your Company

Here's what to look for in a good domain name.
  1. A good domain name is relatively short. A short name -- if you can get it -- is important for several reasons. It is easy to fit into logos, makes a better brand, is more easily recognizable, and is harder to misspell. Some companies have 50-character domain names spelling out their whole company name. That's unwise. Long domain names don't fit in forms, on billboards, or in Google PPC ads. Keep them relatively short.
  2. A good domain name is memorable. You remember generic names, such as Art.com and Garden.com. But you also remember more unique names such as Amazon.com, Google.com, and FogDog.com. Putting together strange combinations of words is fun and can be very productive. It helps if it rhymes like FogDog, or repeats sounds such as Google, or is sing-songy like WilsonWeb. Say your prospective domain name out loud to listen to its sounds. See if your tongue gets twisted around any syllables. Whatever your domain name, it should stick in the mind.
  3. A good domain name isn't easily confused with others. In their desperation to find a domain name, some grasped at hyphenated names and put "the" in front of a word, as in TheStandard.com. The problem is confusion. Trademark laws are designed to prevent customer confusion. If the holder of a similar domain name is first to trademark his combination, it could threaten your domain name, or at least your ability to use it as a brand. Be sure to check with the US Patent and Trademark database (www.uspto.gov/main/trademarks.htm) or the trademark database for your country. Another consideration is how you'll need to say your domain name over the phone. If you always have to say "spelled ding-hyphen-doodle.com" you'll soon wish you'd left out the hyphens. Do your best to find a name that can't be confused.
  4. A good domain name is hard to misspell. If people can misspell something, they will. The longer and more complex your domain name, the harder it is for your customers to type it in correctly. Many of them can't type well to start with, so to type in a long name may lose you lots of business. At the low price of domain names, it may pay you to purchase the misspellings of a domain name, too. This way you'll get the traffic intended for your site and discourage poachers from buying up the variants. Poachers can be driven off by lawsuits if you have trademark protection, but you don't want that hassle.
  5. A good domain name relates to your business name or core business. It's best if your domain name can be guessed from your company name. But in your search for a domain name, don't give up if you can't find the domain for your exact business name. Find functional names, names that describe your uniqueness, names that express an emotion or attitude.
  6. A good domain name sounds solid to your target audience. If possible, get a .com domain or the domain that has the most respect in your country. You can get a .biz or .info, or .cc, .ws, .tv, and .to. (The latter are the country top level domains of the small nations of Cocos (Keeling) Islands, (Western) Samoa, Tuvalu, and Tonga, respectively). The problem is that the general public, in the US anyway, is accustomed to .com, or maybe .net (though .net and .org aren't nearly as well regarded). Offbeat domain names sound ... offbeat and suspect. Your main domain should be the one that people expect it to be. In the US, that's probably .com. In France it would be .fr. If you want to appeal to an international audience, .com is probably best. Having said that, I think it's wise to buy up other common domain name endings. They're cheap. If you become successful you'll wish you had kept them away from poachers. This helps your main domain name stay unique.

Getting the Creative Process Going

Several tools can help you in the process of coming up with a company name or a domain name -- most of them owned by domain registrars to attract business. Some of the best are no longer available online, but here are a few:
DomainFellow.com (www.domainfellow.com) lets you start with a keyword and then adds up to 1,000 popular prefixes or suffixes to that word. For each combination you can see which domains are available and which have been taken.
MakeWords.com (www.makewords.com) lets you select the length and language of a possible domain name, plus a prefix and suffix. Then it generates possible matches and tells you if they are available.
NameBoy (www.nameboy.com) is one of the oldest and best. You enter a primary and a secondary word to work with, select the type of site you have, and whether or not you want to turn on the hyphenation and rhyming features, then let 'r rip! It works like one of those children's books that allows you to play with multiple head, body, and leg combinations.
DomainNameSoup.com (www.domainnamesoup.com) allows you to mix and match words with domain names. Tools allow you to experiment with various combinations of hyphens, prepending and appending words, changing letters of a domain anem, searching for typos, trying multiple choices, looking for synonyms, jumbling word combinations, etc. For the results they'll tell you what's available and what's not.
Be aware! The above services don't necessarily have the best or lowest cost domain registrar services. For that I recommend GoDaddy (www.wilsonweb.com/afd/godaddy.htm), the one I currently use.

Domain Names as Branding

Don't forget that your domain name automatically becomes your brand-name, whether you intend it or not. It will forever after affect how your company is perceived.
The time you take to select your name is time well spent. The money you spend for marketing or branding consultants to help you get the very best name is a good investment, too.

Wednesday, 4 May 2011

How to Use Network Behavior Analysis Tools

 Network behavior analysis tools can help tune operations as well as improve security. Here are five tips for getting the job done.
What's happening on the enterprise network—or more to the point, what's occurring on the network that should not be—is a major concern of security executives. If someone is trying to hack in, or a virus or worm is spreading, or a denial-of-service attack is underway, there might be evidence of these types of activities before they become a major problem.
Network behavior analysis (NBA) technology helps organizations detect and stop suspicious activity on corporate networks in a timely manner—possibly preventing, or at least limiting, serious damage from attacks. NBA is designed to give security managers a level of network visibility they need in order to make sure security threats are quickly identified and remedied.
The products analyze network traffic through data gathered from devices such as IP traffic flow systems, or via packet analysis. They use a combination of signature and anomaly detection to alert security and network managers of any activity that appears to be out of the norm, providing a view of the network that lets managers analyze activity and respond before there's damage to systems and data.
"A key benefit of NBA systems is the [network] visibility that they provide," says Lawrence Orans, research director at Gartner, who leads the firm's NBA coverage. Orans says this visibility helps in two areas: network operations (for example, troubleshooting and performance) and security (i.e. malware monitoring and detecting unwanted applications).
NBA can be used to detect behavior that might be missed by other security technologies such as intrusion prevention systems (IPS), firewalls and security information and event management (SIEM) systems, according to Gartner. Those technologies might not identify threats that they are not specifically configured to look for. Gartner says NBA is suitable as a complementary technology to intrusion detection and prevention software, which is effective for addressing network attacks that can be positively identified.
Vendors addressing the network behavior analysis market include many of the broader, established network and security companies as well as niche players that specialize in the technology. Those that focus specifically on NBA are Arbor Networks, Lancope, Mazu Networks and Q1 Labs. Companies including Cisco Systems, Internet Security Systems (part of IBM), NetFort Technologies, Sourcefire and Securify (to be acquired by Security Computing) also offer products with some type of NBA capabilities.
Among the common functionality and features of behavior analysis systems are the use of network flow data to identify suspicious behavior on the network and where it's coming from; mitigation to stop malicious activity and fix network problems; and reports on all network configurations and user behavior.
Orans says some NBA vendors are enhancing their products by adding identity capabilities. "Specifically, some vendors have added the ability to map a user [identification] to an IP address," he says. "This provides the benefit of quickly identifying a user who is responsible for anomalous or malicious traffic." So, instead of being notified that a particular IP address is exhibiting anomalous behavior, a manager can know exactly which user in the organization is conducting the anomalous behavior.
"This is especially valuable for forensic analysis," Orans says. "If you are using an NBA system to analyze a breach that occurred in the past—maybe three months ago—then it is often difficult to map the IP address, which is assigned dynamically, to a user. It's difficult unless your NBA system can do it for you.
Before deploying NBA, security managers need to figure out which system is a good fit for their network and how best to use the technology. Here are five tips on evaluating, purchasing and implementing NBA offerings.
1. Before putting in NBA, first deploy intrusion prevention technology.
"NBA systems are best for organizations that have already implemented IPS systems" and are looking for more visibility into their network and network traffic, Orans says. "NBA is not something that you do before IPS or instead of IPS. It is done afterward because it provides visibility."
After successfully deploying IPS and firewalls with appropriate processes for tuning, analysis and remediation, consider adding behavior analysis to identify network events and behavior that are undetectable using other techniques, Orans says. He notes that the size of an organization does matter when it comes to NBA.
"NBA is for large enterprises, it's not for SMBs," Orans says. "The expertise and experience level needed to tune an NBA solution and interpret its results is beyond most SMB network and security professionals."
2. Conduct a thorough analysis prior to selecting a vendor's offering.
It might sound obvious, but NBA systems can cause more harm than good if they're not carefully selected based on the needs of the organization, existing network components, level of in-house expertise, etc.
When evaluating NBA systems, make sure they meet the organization's requirements for analysis and reporting, and can be integrated with existing networks. Also, consider how easy or difficult the system is to calibrate and use.
"Think of all the devices you need to collect flows from," says John Kindervag, senior analyst, security and risk management, at Forrester Research in Cambridge, Mass. "Will they all support sending flows? Will enabling flows on the device negatively impact its performance?"
Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC), a New York—based firm that provides clearing, settlement and information services for a variety of financial instruments including equities, corporate and municipal bonds, and government and mortgage-backed securities, evaluated several NBA vendors and reviewed market research on the technology within its security department, before selecting a product from Mazu Networks, says Neil Wasserman, vice president, Core and Smart Network Services at DTCC.
"We installed a Mazu demo and ran it through a rigorous evaluation," Wasserman says. "The product met our requirements—and the rest is history."
3. Test before broad rollout.
Experts say it's important to thoroughly test an NBA system before moving ahead with a full-scale implementation. That way, security managers can see what kind of actual reporting they will get on network activity.
"The only way to properly evaluate the tools [is] to install them in your live production network," Kindervag says. "Any other evaluation methodology, lab, etc., will not provide true results."
AirTran Airways, Orlando, Fla., a low-fare airline designed for business travelers, had vendor Lancope conduct an onsite proof-of-concept trial of its StealthWatch product before the system was rolled out broadly, says Michelle Stewart, manager of information security at AirTran. The proof-of-concept "had no impact [on] our production environment and demonstrated the effectiveness of the reporting."
During the implementation, AirTran worked closely with a Lancope engineer and deployed the system according to Lancope best practices, Stewart says.
AirTran's security team uses StealthWatch for network monitoring, reporting and forensics. The network team uses the system to troubleshoot behavior-related network issues, Stewart says. Managers can examine granular data about network behavior by zone, node and user, and collect historical data to view trends.
4. Tune NBA systems to cut down on false positives.
Experts says it's important to take the time to effectively tune NBA systems to gather relevant network data and help reduce false positives.
If an organization fails to fine-tune NBA systems adequately, it might have to contend with a lot of false-positive readings that overburden the network and security managers who need to examine all the alerts.
"We did this tuning exercise immediately upon implementation, and it proved extremely valuable," Stewart says. "After segregating our network geographically and logically into zones, we examined the behavior within our high-risk zones for volume and type of traffic. In several cases, the port/protocol information we were given from our application vendors was found to be incomplete, but by using StealthWatch we were able to properly fingerprint the application behavior."
After tuning the zone behavior policies appropriate to the high-risk zones, "our alarm count was much more manageable and useful," Stewart says. "This information also allows us to properly plan WAN bandwidth growth, as we can determine how much legitimate network traffic is required for business."
5. Use NBA data to help determine network usage patterns.
Stewart says it was important that AirTran managers spend as much time as necessary reviewing the behavior data gathered to appropriately classify zones, zone policies and services.
"We discovered a great deal about ports, protocols and chattiness of third-party applications during this exercise," Stewart says. "Our zones include geographic segregation, allowing both security and networking to quickly review and treat WAN location issues. We defined server zones by behavior, allowing more granular control over alerting."
Also, in using NBA systems, it's important to create focused views and logical groupings within the tool that make sense, says Wasserman. "Strive for ease of use and an easy understanding of common sense nomenclature and device or host groupings," he says. "Limit the number of flows that need to be queried or viewed" in order to get useful network information on a more timely basis.
That way, NBA can provide not only greater network visibility, but an effective way to deal with trouble when it arises.



Firewall audit tools: features and functions


Why would anyone need firewall audit software? If you're already jugging hundreds of rules on multiple firewalls, here's what these tools can do for you.

Firewall audit tools automate the otherwise all-but-impossible task of analyzing complex and bloated rule sets to verify and demonstrate enterprise access controls and configuration change-management processes.
Although the market has been driven by compliance—it was essentially created by PCI DSS—these tools can also allow organizations to improve network performance, reduce downtime, improve security and reassign staff from shooting down firewall issues and analyzing configurations to taking on tasks that help grow the business.
The problems are familiar to organizations of all sizes—from those with just one or two overtaxed and inefficient firewalls, to large, distributed enterprises with scores or hundreds of firewalls administered by many business units, often all following different policies that may have been written before the units' acquisitions.

Also see Firewall audit dos and don'ts for practical implementation advice


Not long ago, 200-300 rules was considered excessive. Now, it's not unusual for firewalls to have many hundreds or even thousands of rules, many of which were rendered obsolete when IT operations added new rules to meet business requests but neglected to remove any old ones. Analyzing configurations for a few firewalls, let alone hundreds, has grown beyond the capacity of human computation.

Firewall Audit Tools: Key Benefits and Use Cases

Business efficiency and security may be the goals, but regulatory requirements frequently open up the budget. The firewall audit market, pegged by Forrester Research at $25 million to $30 million in 2009, is fueled by PCI DSS requirements to review firewall and router configurations every six months. These controls also typically come under scrutiny during internal, partner and other regulatory audits.
Enterprises exhaust countless man-hours analyzing firewall and router configurations to produce audit reports, only to realize that they do not have a firm grasp on their network access controls and the change-management processes that enable them.
"How do you demonstrate that a 2,000-rule set is robust and secure?" says a security officer for a telecommunications company, which uses SkyBox Security's SkyBox Assure solution. "It's impossible to do manually."
These automated tools run complex algorithms that evaluate the actual rules against corporate policies and best practices to identify gaps, verify changes and produce audit reports. They enable organizations to verify and document the entire configuration-management lifecycle to demonstrate to auditors that practice follows policy, and that changes were completed as authorized and grant the intended access.
"There's nothing more embarrassing or devastating to an organization than when you tell an auditor, 'This is how we do it,' and when they look, there is no semblance of what you said," says Jeff Sherwood, principal security strategist for H&R Block, a Secure Passage customer. "Now we can come out of the gate and say, 'This is what we do and here is proof we do it.'"
While compliance automation may be sufficient justification for their implementation, firewall audit tools also offer tangible business benefits that go beyond surviving the audit ordeal.
Performance and Optimization: This is a prime function of all these tools. Firewall performance degrades because excessive rules eat up CPU cycles, and critical access rules are situated too far down in the hierarchy because when additions were made, the focus was on speed of implementation, rather than on optimizing the configuration. Firewall audit tools clean up redundant rules and requests for service that have already been enabled, and flag rules that apply to objects that are no longer in use or even in existence.

Also see SIEM Dos and Don'ts


Optimizing firewalls and network devices can improve performance problems that companies might otherwise have had to throw new hardware at. Benefits will be even more noticeable as traffic increases.
Business Continuity: Performance and optimization issues can seriously slow or even bring down critical business processes. This costs the business not only revenue, but also the man-hours it must spend to deal with the problems.
"Before, our team was heavily weighted—30 percent of their time—to firefighting, toward fault analysis and fault fixing," says Colin Miles, corporate network manager for U.K.-based Virgin Media, a Tufin Technologies user with a network infrastructure that includes more than 100 firewall pairs. "Since Tufin was implemented, that's turned to proactive capability, rule-based efficiency and optimization of the network, driving toward people savings."
Security: Complex configurations make security analysis very difficult. Obsolete or misconfigured rules can be exploited to give attackers access to sensitive data. Firewall administrators under pressure to fulfill business requests are likely to err on the side of granting too much access rather than too little. Firewall audit tools improve security by determining optimal rules and detecting unused and misconfigured rules.
Firewall Upgrade and Migration: Upgrading firewalls and consolidating onto fewer platforms create excellent opportunities for organizations to use an audit tool. It's a good time to cost-justify configuration cleanup and firewall optimization, rather than carrying over the old infrastructure's issues. Since these products support multiple firewall platforms, they are well-suited for consolidation, streamlining the configurations on each and translating them onto the new platform. Virgin Media, for example, consolidated from numerous legacy platforms brought over through corporate acquisition to Check Point firewalls for its dynamic environments and Cisco for more static conditions.
Change Management: Change-management policies and processes can fall short when requests are made out-of-band, which happens when either someone fails to follow procedure or there's an urgent need to enable or restore service for critical business processes. Several vendors have complementary workflow products that automatically document all configuration changes and reconcile them with ticketing systems.

Firewall audit dos and don'ts

Firewall audit products are maturing, but the product class is still a relatively young, small market, defined by compliance requirements. You have a fairly limited choice of vendors, including Tufin Software Technologies, AlgoSec, Secure Passage and Athena Security, which all come with firewall audit pedigrees, and RedSeal Systems and Skybox Security, which are primarily vendors of risk-mitigation tools, and so go beyond firewall audit to feature sophisticated risk-assessment and risk-management capabilities.
Take the time to define your requirements, narrow down your choices and put candidates to the test.

See the companion article Firewall audit tools: features and functions on CSOonline.com

DO look at platform and device coverage. These products generally support all the major firewall vendors and some others, as well as major network devices, so you should be covered. Take both present and future needs into account. For example, you may run a single platform across the organization now, but future acquisitions may run on other vendors' infrastructures. These tools should be able to help whether you plan to migrate onto a single platform or continue to manage several while still realizing the efficiencies they promise. See if the vendor has a software development kit that can allow it to integrate with unsupported platforms.
Check that coverage for network devices is included. There are a couple of considerations here. First, it may be important to you to clean up and optimize access control lists on your routers, and second, routers are increasingly featuring more built-in security capabilities.
DON'T overlook scalability. Those vendors that focus largely on enterprise deployments claim they can scale up to thousands of devices. Determine what that actually means in terms of management and the ability to perform under stress.
"In addition, the magnitude of environment brings huge demands on technology and methods that can be used," says the telecommunications company security officer. "What in a smaller company can be rock solid may not be applicable in a big environment. You need be cautious about the limitation of technology."
Choose with growth in mind. Even if a product scales to your current requirements, how well-suited is it to meet greater demands as the business grows, services are added, acquisitions are integrated and traffic increases?
DON'T buy more than you need. Some of these products are aimed at complex, heterogeneous environments with hundreds of firewalls and network devices. Measure the tool's capabilities and cost against your environment. If your firewall environment is relatively simple and static and your traffic is fairly predictable, choose a less-expensive product that you can apply initially for your optimization project and periodically to keep your firewalls under control.
DO put these products to the test once you narrow your choices to those that claim to meet most of your requirements.
"Pick two or three of your favorites and bake them off in real-world situations," says John Kindervag, senior analyst at Forrester Research. "The nice thing about firewall-auditing products is that you can test them on a live production environment because they are passive tools."
Kindervag recommends testing how well they do at finding unused rules, optimizing configurations and so on, then comparing reports.
"Run the results by your firewall guru or bring in one who can say, 'Yes, that's a good rule change,'" he says.
You can also determine whether they actually scale and deliver analysis at the speeds they claim and what kind of hardware they'd require.
DO determine your reporting requirements and evaluate the products' capabilities accordingly. Audit reports should come first and foremost for most organizations. Evaluate the quality of summary reports—are they sufficient to prove that your control policies are, in fact, carried out?
Also, make sure that you can produce satisfactory reports on demand in response to specific auditor queries. Some products offer regulation-specific reports, usually for PCI DSS, which may be useful.
Since these are management tools, you'll want to see useful operational reporting that quickly lets you see what has been done and what needs to be addressed. Make sure the reports deliver the information you want at the level of detail you need. For example, rule usage can change over time. A rule that was optimally placed at first may become a bottleneck as it's hit with more and more traffic, and may need to be moved up in the hierarchy.

Also see How to Use Network Behavior Analysis Tools


Finally, high-level reports can demonstrate overall improvements in efficiency and security, as well as highlight which business units may be lax in properly managing their networks.
DO consider workflow integration. Most vendors offer complimentary workflow products to integrate their core capabilities with change-management workflow tools, such as ticketing systems. This may not be important if your organization has a well-defined process and supporting tools, either homegrown or commercial. But some companies find this capability useful in automating their change-management programs.
DON'T give short shrift to hardware, especially if you are running one of these products in a virtual environment in which resource-sharing may be an issue.
Make sure you have enough CPU and memory muscle to support the product under live conditions, and make provisions for growth as traffic increases.
Alternatively, you could go with one of the three appliance-based solutions Tufin offers in addition to its software.
DO review and refine your policies and procedures before buying and deploying a firewall audit product.
Enterprise IT governance and information security is built on well-defined policies and processes. Technological tools reduce error, improve efficiency and automate analysis that frustrates manual efforts, but you won't get their full benefit if you are simply throwing technology at a problem. Every organization is different, but here are some basic guidelines:
  • Examine corporate practices and procedures across business groups and departments. Make sure they can be applied across the organization while allowing for acceptable deviations to meet specialized needs.
  • Create a process that is documented at each step and holds each stakeholder accountable.
  • Where possible, express requests in terms of business need, rather than in narrow IT terms.
  • Have a team that evaluates requests in terms of adherence to corporate policy.
  • Conduct both business- and technology-based risk assessments. Implementation should be dependent on passing the risk assessment.
  • Test implementation for final sign-off by both IT and the business owner.
  • Document.
  • Rinse and repeat.

Penetration tests: 10 tips for a successful program


Penetration tests need to accomplish business goals, not just check for random holes. Here's how to get the most value for your efforts.

Why are you performing penetration tests? Whether you're using an internal team, outside experts or a combination of the two, are you simply satisfying regulatory or audit requirements, or do you actually expect to improve enterprise security?
We asked penetration testing experts for guidance on how to improve your program to get the most benefit for your time, money and effort. If you turn to outside expertise, their advice will show you what to expect and demand from consultants. The following 10 tips will show you understand the goal and focus of your testing; develop effective testing strategies; make effective use of your personnel; and make the most effective use of pen test results to remediate issues, improve processes and continuously improve enterprise security posture.

Penetration Test Tip 1: Define Your Goals

Penetration testing—really, all information security activity—is about protecting the business. You are taking on the role of attacker to find the vulnerabilities and exploiting them to determine the risks to the business and making recommendations to improve security based on your findings. Attackers are trying to steal your data—their techniques are a means to an end. So too, penetration testing: It's not about the cool technical things you can do to exploit a vulnerability; it's about discovering where the business risk is greatest. "If can't express things in terms of my business, you're not providing me value," said Ed Skoudis, founder and senior security consultant at InGuardians. "Don't tell me you've exploited a vulnerability and gotten shell on that box without telling me what that means for my business."
Also see Network stress test tools: dos and don'ts on CSOonline.com
With that understanding, from a more tactical perspective, penetration testing is a good way to determine how well your security policies, controls and technologies are actually working. Your company is investing a lot of money in products, patching systems, securing endpoints etc. As a pen tester, you are mimicking an attacker, trying to bypass or neutralize security controls.
"You're trying to give the company a good assessment if their money is being well spent," said Alberto Solino, founder and director of security consulting services of Core Security.
The goal should not be to simply get a check box for pen testing to meet compliance requirements, such as PCI DSS. Pen tests should be aimed at more than discovering vulnerabilities (vulnerability scanning should be part of a pen testing program but is not a substitute). Unless the testing is part of a sustained program for discovering, exploiting and correcting security weaknesses, your money and effort will have gained you at best that check mark, and at worst, a failed audit by a sharp assessor.

Penetration Test Tip 2: Follow the data

Organizations have limited budget and limited resources for pen testing, regardless of whether you are conducting internal tests, hiring outside consultants or using a combination of both. You can't conduct penetration tests across your entire IT infrastructure, spanning hundreds or thousands of devices, yet pen testers will often be told to try to compromise devices across an extensive range of IP addresses. The result is likely to be the most cursory of testing regimens, yielding little or no value. You can't even expect to conduct vulnerability scans and remediate flaws across a very large number of devices in a reasonable amount of time and at reasonable cost. "In many cases customers have thousand of IP addresses they want us to pen test," said Omar Khawaja, Global Products Manager, Verizon Security Solutions. "We could run vulnerability tests and see what's most vulnerable, but they may not be the most important to your organization."
Step back and ask, "What am I trying to protect?" What critical data is at risk: credit card data, patient information, personally identifiable customer information, business plans, intellectual property? Where does the information reside? Do you even know every database, every file repository and every log store that contains sensitive data? You may not know, but chances are an attacker will find it.
So, the first critical step is to narrow the scope of pen testing is data discovery: determining which sensitive data is at risk and where it is. Then the task is to play the role of attacker and figure out how to get at the prize. (Read Red team versus blue team for more ideas on this approach.)
"The idea to mimic what a real attacker will do during time frame agreed to with the customer," said Core Security's Solino, "not to find all the possible problems."

Penetration Test Tip 2: Follow the data

Organizations have limited budget and limited resources for pen testing, regardless of whether you are conducting internal tests, hiring outside consultants or using a combination of both. You can't conduct penetration tests across your entire IT infrastructure, spanning hundreds or thousands of devices, yet pen testers will often be told to try to compromise devices across an extensive range of IP addresses. The result is likely to be the most cursory of testing regimens, yielding little or no value. You can't even expect to conduct vulnerability scans and remediate flaws across a very large number of devices in a reasonable amount of time and at reasonable cost. "In many cases customers have thousand of IP addresses they want us to pen test," said Omar Khawaja, Global Products Manager, Verizon Security Solutions. "We could run vulnerability tests and see what's most vulnerable, but they may not be the most important to your organization."
Step back and ask, "What am I trying to protect?" What critical data is at risk: credit card data, patient information, personally identifiable customer information, business plans, intellectual property? Where does the information reside? Do you even know every database, every file repository and every log store that contains sensitive data? You may not know, but chances are an attacker will find it.
So, the first critical step is to narrow the scope of pen testing is data discovery: determining which sensitive data is at risk and where it is. Then the task is to play the role of attacker and figure out how to get at the prize. (Read Red team versus blue team for more ideas on this approach.)
"The idea to mimic what a real attacker will do during time frame agreed to with the customer," said Core Security's Solino, "not to find all the possible problems."

Penetration Test Tip 3: Talk to the Business Owners

Work with the business people. They know what is at risk—what data is critical, what applications create and interface with that data. They will know at least the more obvious places in which the data resides. They will tell you which applications must be kept up and running.
You'll learn much of what you need to know about the threat level associated with particular applications, the value of the data and the assets that are important in the risk equation.
An important part of this process is to work with people who understand the business logic of the application. Knowing what the application is supposed to do and how it's supposed to work will help you find its weaknesses and exploit them.
"Define the scope that includes critical information assets and business transaction processing," said InGuardians' Skoudis. "Brainstorm with the pen test team and management together."
Skoudis also suggests asking for management to give their worst case scenario, "what's the worst thing that could happen if someone hacks you?" The exercise helps scope the project by determining where "the real crown jewels" are.

Penetration Test Tip 4: Test Against the Risk

The value of the data/applications should determine the type of testing to be conducted. For low-risk assets, periodic vulnerability scanning is a cost-effective use of resources. Medium risk might call for a combination of vulnerability scans and manual vulnerability investigation. For high-risk assets, conduct exploitative penetration testing. For example, the security director for a large university said they started performing pen testing to meet PCI DSS requirements. Once that program was in place, it became the model for testing a potential attacker's ability to penetrate their systems. The university classifies data as public, internal, sensitive and highly sensitive.
For information that's highly sensitive, we perform pen testing under much the same guidelines as PCI," he said. "We back off from there, based on some specific criteria and some subjective judgment that goes into what level of pen testing, if any, will be done for system."
So, for example, on the lower end of the risk spectrum the university will test a random sample of systems and/or applications, depending on criteria for a particular category and time and budget constraints. With tens of thousands of devices on a campus network, even a low-level scan of all of them would be infeasible.
"You can test on a business system that has a clear owner and systems administrator," he said. "But when you have 3,000 Wiis attached to the network, you don't want to scan those and figure out who they belong to."

Penetration Test Tip 5: Develop attacker profiles

Your pen testers need to think like and act like real attackers. But attackers don't fit into one neat category. Build profiles of potential attackers. External attackers may have little or no knowledge of your company, perhaps just some IP addresses. They may be former employees or work for partners or service providers and have considerable knowledge of the inside of your network. An insider may be a systems administrator or DBA with privileged access and authorization and knows where critical data resides.
Motive is a factor in developing profiles. Is the attacker after credit card numbers and PII that can be turned into cash? Intellectual property to sell to a competitor or gain a business advantage? The attacker may be politically/ideologically or competitively motivated to bring your Web application down. He may be an angry ex-employee who wants to "get back at the company."
Work with business owners to help fashion these profiles and learn what types of potential attackers they are most concerned about.
The profile narrows the focus of the pen testing, and tests will vary based on each of these multiple profiles.
"We get a snapshot of what a particular attacker can do against a target, and we don't mix results," said Core Security's Solino. "For every profile, we get the result of the pen test and do another profile."

Penetration Test Tip 6: The More Intelligence the Better

Information gathering is as much a part of the process as the actual exploit—identify devices, operating systems, applications, databases, etc. The more you know about a target and its connected systems, the better chance you have of breaking in.
Each step may yield valuable information that will allow you to attack another asset that will eventually get you into the target database, file share etc. The information will allow you to narrow the search for exploitable vulnerabilities. This reconnaissance is typically performed using automated scanning and mapping tools, but you can also use social engineering methods, such as posing as a help desk person or a contractor on the phone, to gather valuable information.
"We're increasingly starting to do social engineering," said Verizon's Khawaja. "It's essentially reconnaissance—performed with the permission of the customer—to let us find everything in the environment that could assist us in breaking in."
Multi-stage penetration testing typically is a repeated cycle of reconnaissance, vulnerability assessment and exploitation, each step giving you the information to penetrate deeper into the network.

Penetration Test Tip 7: Consider All Attack Vectors

Attackers can and will exploit different aspects of your IT infrastructure, individually or, frequently, in combination to get the data they are seeking. Thorough pen tests will leverage any and all of these potential attack vectors, based on the attacker's end goal, rather than the vulnerability of each.
"A few years ago we would do network penetration testing, and application pen testing and wireless pen testing, and then we stepped back and said 'that makes absolutely no sense," said Solino. "The bad guy doesn't say, 'I can only break into a system using the network.'"
Successful pen tests, like real attacks, may leverage any number of paths that include a number of steps till you hit pay dirt. A print server may not seem particularly interesting, but it may use the same admin login credentials as a database containing credit card information.
"Pen testers find flaws and exploit them, then pivot from that machine to another machine, to yet another," said InGuardians' Skoudis.
An attack on a Web application might fail in terms of exploitation, but yield information that helps exploit other assets on the network. Or an attacker might get information about employees without high privileges, but with access to the internal network that act as a springboard.
Also see How to compare and use wireless intrusion detection systems
So, a critical resource may not be directly assailable, but can be compromised through other systems.
For example, said Khawaja, Verizon pen testers were unable to directly compromise a Web server that had access to a sensitive database. If the testers focused narrowly on testing the Web application on that server, the conclusion would be that the data was safe. But by taking a data-centric approach, they discovered that the Web server was connected to a second Web server, which had a critical vulnerability that an attacker could exploit to gain access to the first Web server and, hence, the database. (Read more about Web application attacks in How to evaluate and use Web application security scanners.)
"We care about anything that isn't cordoned off from the network segment we are targeting," he said. "Are there any network controls to prevent an attacker from jumping from a vulnerable low-value system to a more critical system?"
That being said, there are valid cases for vector-specific testing. For example, a company may be particularly concerned about wireless security, because it knows it has been somewhat lax in this area or may have recently installed or upgraded WLAN infrastructure. But even if you are confident that a particular vector is safe—for example , if the wireless network is isolated from the credit card database—don't be too sure. Attack paths can be complex and byzantine.

Penetration Test Tip 8: Define the Rules of Engagement

Pen testing simulates attack behavior, but it is not an attack. Whether you are conducting in-house testing or contracting with a consultant, you need to establish parameters that define what can and cannot be done, and when, and who needs to know.
The latter depends on whether you are conducting white box or black box testing. In the former case, there's probably an acknowledgement that the security program of the company (or a particular department or business unit) needs a lot of work, and the pen testing is open process known to all involved.
On the other hand, black box testing is more clandestine, conducted more like a real attack—strictly on a need to know basis. You are determining how good the company's people are at their jobs and the effectiveness of the processes and systems supporting them.
"Whether it's the operations center, or the investigative response team or physical security guards, everyone has to pretend it's just another day at the office," said Verizon's Khawaja.
Typically, companies will perform white box testing first to learn the security issues that have to be addressed. Subsequently, black box testing will help determine if the initial findings have been effectively remediated. Sometimes, for example, a CSO will want to know not only how vulnerable critical systems are, but how good their personnel are at detecting and responding to an attack.
In either case, certain key people need to be involved to avoid problems that might impact the business or undermine the testing. At least one person in the target environment who is involved in the change control process should be in the loop, said InGuardians' Skoudis. Under the rules of engagement, for example, the company may permit the pen testers to install software on the target devices to do more in-depth pivoting, but at least that one person has to be involved to make sure that the testers are not stopped by dropping their IP address from a router ACL or invoking a firewall rule.
In both white box and black box scenarios, Skoudis recommends daily briefings with the test stakeholders to let them know what the testers are doing. For example, the rules of engagement may allow the pen testers to exploit vulnerabilities, but the briefing can be used to give folks a heads up that they are about to do it.
"It builds bridges," he said. "It shows the pen testers are not a distant, evil group that is out to 'catch me.' Rather, it's all about transparency and openness."
The rules of engagement also may set limits on what may and may not be exploited, such as client machines, or techniques that may or may not be used, such as social engineering.

Penetration Test Tip 9: Report Findings and Measure Progress

The goal of penetration testing is to improve your security posture, so if you are conducting internal tests, your report should provide useful, actionable and specific information.
"The goal is to help improve security, for management to make decisions to improve business and help the operations team improve security," said InGuardians' Skoudis.
You should provide an executive summary, but the heart of your reporting should include detailed descriptions of the vulnerabilities you found, how you exploited them and what assets would be at risk if a real attack took place. Detail every step used to penetrate, each vulnerability that had to be exploited, and, most important, perhaps, all the attack paths.
"The beauty of identifying the attack path is that it allows you to solve specific problems by breaking the path," said Core Security's Solino.
Be very specific about recommendations. If architectural changes are required, include diagrams. Explain how to verify that a fix is in place (use this command, or that tool to measure). In cases where multiple systems are involved, explain how to mass deploy a fix, using GPOs if possible.
Make sure that each recommended remediation includes a caveat that the solution is thoroughly tested before it is implemented in a production environment. Enterprise IT infrastructure may be very complex.
"This is a huge issue," said Skoudis. "You don't know all the subtleties. You don't want to break production."
Penetration testing should not be a one-time exercise, and successive results should be compared. If you are performing internal testing, put together deltas to measure how your people are addressing issues. If the problems from the last test—or the last two—remain unaddressed, you may have a problem. Perhaps the software patching program isn't working as it should, or developers are not being properly trained to write secure code.
"What we're looking for are trends," said the university security director. "It's just like you would treat an audit report. If you have repeat findings, it indicates you might have a more serious problem."

Penetration Test Tip 10: Decide Who Your Pen Testers Are

The decision to use in-house staff for pen-testing depends on the size of your organization, the value of the information you are trying to protect and where you want to put your internal resources. A company may have a dedicated pen testing team or a group within the security team. An internal team is in a better position to conduct regular testing. If your organization is large and distributed, create mechanisms and promote an environment in which information can be shared.
"If have internal community that can share information, make sure they have a strong knowledge base backed up by mature knowledge management systems," said Verizon's Khawaja . "You want to make sure that what happened in your Beligian unit doesn't happen in Brazil."
Even if you do some in-house testing, there are good reasons for hiring consultants to perform at least some of the work. Some regulations require external companies to perform pen tests; consider that insiders may have too much information about the target systems, as well as a vested interest in the outcome. So, beyond compliance requirements, it's a good idea to bring a fresh view from the outside periodically.
For the same reasons, if you do hire outside testing consultants, rotate among vendors, just as would with auditors every few years.
"Bringing in outside people gives an added degree of confidence in the results," said the university security director. "There's no perception of conflict of interest."—
For your internal team, look for the right blend of knowledge and curiosity.
A good training candidate, said Core's Solino, has a strong knowledge of networking and application protocols as a foundation. Mostly, he looks for curiosity and a hacker mentality.
"It's IT knowledge and that attitude, a specific mindset that denies something is secure and says, 'Go for it!'"
"This is an art," said Skoudis. "Although there are tools and methodologies, you have to be creative in finding problems in target systems and applications."






Network Security: The Basics


New to network security? Before you get lost in the bits and bytes, this guideline provides a look at the essential concepts.

There are exactly two keys to information security or information assurance: first, configure the system and network correctly and keep it that way. Because this is impossible to do perfectly, the second key to information assurance is to know the traffic coming into and out of your network.[1] That way, if something terrible is happening you can detect it. Therefore, all the tasks that have to be done in network security break down into three phases or classes:
  • Protection, where we configure our systems and networks as correctly as possible
  • Detection, where we identify the configuration has changed or that some network traffic indicates a problem
  • Reaction, after identifying quickly, we respond to any problem and return to a safe state as rapidly as possible

Defense in Depth
Because we cannot achieve perfect security we have to accept a certain level of risk. Risk is defined as the probability a threat will cross vulnerability. Risk is hard to calculate, but we get a rough idea by considering our attack surface, the exposure, and the reachable and exploitable vulnerabilities that we have. A vulnerability scanner or penetration test helps us measure or define our attack surface. One thing we do to lower our risk and improve our odds of survival is to use multiple defenses. There are five basic architectures to develop defense in depth.[2]
  • The uniform method of protection for defense-in-depth generally involves a firewall separating the internal trusted zone from the Internet, most implementations have anti-virus in the mail store and forward on the servers and desktops. It generally means that all internal hosts receive the same level of protection from attack by the computer network infrastructure. It is the most commonly and easily implemented architecture and least effective in terms of achieving a high degree of information assurance unless all IT contained information assets are of equal importance to the organization.
  • Protected enclaves simply means subdividing the internal network so that it is not one large zone without internal protections. This can be done with firewalls, VPNs, VLANS and Network Access Control.
  • Information Centric. Adm. Grace Hopper, a famous early researcher in computing said, "Some day, on the corporate balance sheet, there will be an entry which reads, 'Information'; for in most cases, the information is more valuable than the hardware which processes it."[3] it is critical to understand and to be able to help others understand the value of information. In addition to richly valuable information such as intellectual property (patents, trademarks, copyrights, know how, data schema), there is also data including the increasingly important business record. To build an information centric defense-in-depth architecture, we must locate our critical and valuable information and ensure the proper protections are in place. This used to be very costly and was avoided, but due to changes in the Federal Rules of Discovery, many organizations have to build process to locate all information and tag it, so this becomes much easier.
  • Threat Vector Analysis defense-in-depth is similar to information centric; it requires us to identify the assets we want to protect in order of priority, perform an analysis to determine the paths the threat could use to reach the vulnerability and figure out how to place controls on the vectors to prevent the threat from crossing the vulnerability.
  • Role-based access control (RBAC) is an access control method that organizations implement to ensure that access to data is performed by authorized users. Unlike other access control methods, role-based access control assigns users to specific roles, and permissions are granted to each role based on the user's job requirements. Users can be assigned any number of roles in order to conduct day-to-day tasks. For example, a user may need to have a developer role, as well as an analyst role. Each role would define the permissions that are needed to access different objects.[4] With Network Access Control we can extend this from groups on systems to the entire enterprise. It requires more configuration than protected enclaves, but it yields more protection.
  • CryptographyWhen defense in depth fails, the only remaining protection for the data is cryptography. Cryptography is very strong: if your organization is using a modern algorithm, the encrypted information is so powerfully protected, the encrypted data cannot be attacked. However, the processes we use to manage the crypto keys can be attacked, so strong processes related to key management are a must. As an example, many organizations have purchased full disk encryption for their laptops. There is no way to reverse that encryption without the key. However researchers at Princeton recently demonstrated ways to capture the key from memory defeating the protection with many vendor s products.[5] There are three types of cryptography algorithms: secret key, public key, and hash functions. Unlike secret key and public key algorithms, hash functions, also called message digests or one-way encryption, have no key. Instead, a fixed-length hash value is computed based on the plaintext that makes it impossible for either the contents or length of the plaintext to be recovered. The primary application of hash functions in cryptography is message integrity. The hash value provides a digital fingerprint of a message's contents, which ensures that the message has not been altered by an intruder, virus, or by other means. Hash algorithms are effective because of the extremely low probability that two different plaintext messages will yield the same hash value.[6]
    Access, Authentication, Authorization
    Sometimes called Triple A or AAA, these are the keys to implementing security in the organization. Access process should ensure the correct person is accessing your organization s computing and networking resources. Since passwords can be shared, many organizations use a physical token in addition to a password during the authentication process. Once authenticated, controls should be in place to make sure individuals only access the resources they are authorized to access.
    Separation of Duties, Separation of Services
    Separation of duties is a common policy when people are handling money so that fraud requires collusion of two or more parties. This greatly reduces the likelihood of crime. Information should be handled in the same way since it can be bought and sold easily. If your system administrators claim that their duties cannot be broken up, it is important to understand well run organizations do just that.[7] A long time ago, servers were so expensive that a single server would run multiple services. One of the lessons we learned from the first worm (malicious software that spreads by breaking into systems) was that if a server crashed with multiple services running on it we would lose the ability to supply all of those services. For the next ten years, it was considered good practice to have one service per machine; a mail server, a file server, and so forth. Today, with virtual machines and service oriented web architecture, we are moving back to multiple services, in fact far more services than before. This is fine as long as we factor in how to keep operating if something bad happens to that machine. There are fields of study called continuity of operations, disaster recovery and business impact that provide insight into these fields of study.
    Endpoint Security and Ubiquitous Computing
    Wireless networking continues to grow, entire cities are connected with metropolitan wireless, if you have a PDA or advanced cell phone you are connected to the Internet at all times. These devices can communicate with your desktop or laptop computer via Bluetooth. Organizations are going to have to engineer security at the device itself, this is called endpoint security. It is no longer possible to believe in a security model where you are fairly safe because we are connected to a corporate LAN protected by a firewall and an intrusion prevention solution. Rather, we need to consider security in a ubiquitous computing paradigm, always on the Internet wherever we are.
    Web, Web Browsers and AJAX
    Odds are very high that your organization is spending a lot more money on webmasters, web programmers and the like than you were just five years ago. Most software application development is becoming focused on the web for delivery. This means that most of the information entering and leaving the majority of user computers is via the web. However, web browsers such as Internet Explorer were not purposely designed as security gateways. It is possible to attack a user s computer via their browser. Until security becomes the most important priority for web browsing software, problems will continue to exist. This is going to be especially true with the new web 2.0 interfaces that use recently developed extensions to a programming language web browsers support called AJAX to deliver enhanced functionality, but at the cost of increased risk.
    SOA and the Future
    Web based programs are very complex to create and maintain because they potentially offer so much functionality. For instance, if you have an online stock trading account, you can research, trade, run financial reports and even do online banking. To manage complexity and make it possible to get product to market faster, organizations are learning to simply create atomic services. This is known as Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) and may one day be the primary tool to support mission critical applications. If your organization needs a service, it consults a directory called UDDI to find it. This is similar to using a search engine like Google, but programs do this without human intervention, at least that is the idea.
    SOA offers and exposes more business logic than a regular web server, after all each and every service you offer has to be in the directory if you want client programs to find you. A big part of the security battleground of the future will be centered around SOA, limiting the unauthorized release of sensitive information and creating gateways and other tools to protect the services.


     

Log management basics

View log management systems as a source of business intelligence—and choose one that fits your business needs.

System logs generated by servers and other various network apparatus can create data is in vast quantities, and sooner or later, attempts at managing such information in an off-the-cuff fashion is no longer viable.
Consequently, information systems managers are tasked with devising strategies for taming these volumes of log data to remain compliant with company IT policy, and also to gain holistic visibility across all IT systems deployed throughout the organization. With a tad of guidance and a bit of planning, the recipe for log management is actually straightforward, and the rewards are surprisingly favorable.

What is log management?

First and foremost, a definition of log management is in order. The National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) defines log management in Special Publication SP800-92 as: "the process for generating, transmitting, storing, analyzing, and disposing of computer security log data." As you probably knew that much already, what does log management really entail? Put simply, log management is defining what you need to log, how to log it, and how long to retain the information. This ultimately translates into requirements for hardware, software, and of course, policies.
Benefits of log management systems are abundant, and their return on investment is significant. To quantify the value of an investment in this area, it helps to view log management systems as business intelligence systems. Our business is of course information security, but many of the same features and benefits found in traditional BI systems are also present in log management systems. From data extraction, transforming, and loading (ETL) to even back-end enterprise data warehouses, all of the standard BI moving parts are also found in many log management systems.

Also see 'Evaluation criteria for SIEM systems'
View log management systems as a source of business intelligence—and choose one that fits your business needs.The log management system may be a highly specialized business intelligence system in disguise, yet like its business-focused cousin, it brings game-changing benefits to the table. For example, day-to-day transactional data can finally be viewed across the organization as a whole rather than in discrete and disjointed silos. This ability to watch all systems simultaneously is a bit like being everywhere at once. As godly as it may sound, the reality is that this new set of virtual eyes increases your effectiveness without increasing your headcount. Amplified visibility into enterprise-wide events also equates to an increased awareness of real-time activity, which ultimately improves overall security posture by empowering staff to react quickly to malicious events.
Security professionals have long understood the benefits log management systems provide through the centralized storage of logs. Given that it's practically standard operating procedure for hackers to obfuscate their method of intrusion by destroying logs and disabling accounting mechanisms, having a protected and centralized copy of such data ensures that valuable information is preserved for post-mortem analysis, and that evidence is available for any follow-up legal action.

Interestingly, not all benefits of log management systems are security-centric. For instance, many network devices such as routers or firewalls have limited electronic buffers reserved for logging. Once those buffers reach capacity, older entries are discarded to accommodate more recent events. Devices hosted on busy circuits are sure to have high log volume, and discarding the majority of events simply isn't feasible for engineers tasked with troubleshooting operational issues. By forwarding logs to centralized systems that are packed with high-capacity disk drives, operations staff can access event data within time spans that yield adequate context to the issue at hand. Non-volatile storage of log data also opens the door to better infrastructure sizing projections through trend analysis. This allows managers to accurately gauge future growth patterns and perhaps justify budget requests.
For organizations required to comply with legal or regulatory reporting obligations such as those common in the Sarbanes Oxley or HIPAA Acts, properly implemented log management systems can advance the overall efficiency of compliance activities considerably. While many commercial log management solutions flagrantly tout compliance as a major selling point, the degree of variance in real-world auditing requirements and scope is vast, and particular audit controls are often company-specific. (See Jennifer Bayuk's 'Information system audit basics'.) Therefore, any notion of "compliance in a box" should be quickly disregarded as marketing hype.
However, assuming company-specific control audits may be properly massaged into the log management system, reports commonly requested by auditors can be canned into templates that are generated ad-hoc, perhaps even at the auditor's discretion through self-help facilities. Of course, the integrity of a specific log management system must be blessed by your official assessor, so obtaining prior auditor review should be an integral step in the log management system purchase criteria.

Choosing the right log management system

Before making any purchases, it's important to remember that not all log management systems are created equal. Regardless of whether you examine a specific product or a particular service hosted in the cloud, the variation in log management functionality can typically be simplified by ascertaining which category the system falls into. Fortunately, there are only two basic classes of log management system:
Centralized logging servers are just that: no-frills systems designed to simply collect and consolidate logs from numerous sources for later consumption. Venerable contenders in this space are typically of the UNIX variety, and often sport open-source packages such as syslogd or Syslog-ng. Even modest hardware configurations coupled with open source software can handle considerable amounts of log data. However, do keep in mind that raw consolidation power is only part of the equation. Centralized logging servers lend themselves well to complex, hierarchical logging systems in which each component of the system must do one thing very well.
Conversely, if you need a system that can actually analyze data in order to extract meaningful information, then you are instead in the market for a SIEM.
SIEMs take event consolidation to the next level by providing not only event collection, but also aggregation, correlation, alerting, and reporting services. Event aggregation allows users to quickly ascertain how many events occurred without having to painstakingly count each and every event in detail. Correlation is essentially multidimensional analysis that pivots two or more categories of events against each other in order to yield high level information.
A typical example of SIEM correlation would be to automatically connect a series of brute-force login attempts to a sudden spike in network traffic from the host in question. This provides credibility, often in the form of a numeric "weight," to the assumption that one of those brute login attempts actually succeeded. Correlation provides tremendous value to humans staring at otherwise isolated events, and is particularly useful for identifying ominous activity occurring across numerous systems. Finally, alerting allows administrators to configure triggers which notify staff of anomalous or potentially threatening activity, and reporting ties everything together by summarizing events, trends, and incidents in various formats.

Also see 'Network security: The basics' by Stephen Northcutt

While open source SIEMS such as "OSSIM" are starting to make their debut in business environments, their gallant strides toward enterprise adoption are often met with stiff resistance in a market space otherwise dominated by mature, commercial offerings from companies such as Q1 Labs, RSA, and ArcSight. The overall landscape of the SIEM industry is well covered by analyst firms such as Gartner and Forrester, and there are plenty of freely available product reviews to peruse at one's leisure.
Upon examining the available offerings, it should become apparent that most SIEM solutions have a common baseline set of functionality, and follow a relatively standardized pattern of collecting and consolidating logs, transforming the logs into an internal (and almost always proprietary) format, then providing alerting and reporting services on top of this normalized information. Despite the fact that most SIEM offerings share a common set of functions, there are in fact differentiating features as well as strengths and weakness among the competitors. As form should follow function, having a thorough understanding of your organizational requirements will ensure you choose the right log management system.
Before shopping for a log management system, some basic planning on your part is in order. It is imperative to first survey the type of logs your infrastructure generates, and then determine what type of information you plan on gleaning from these event generating systems. This sounds deceptively simple, yet often times turns out to be quite challenging given the fact that even small organizations can easily generate over a dozen different logging formats such Syslog, Netflow, Windows Event Logs, and SNMP.
Adding to the fun are usually a handful proprietary formats as well, more often than not from the telecom side of the house. Wrangling this proverbial herd of cats together with a log management system requires one to think about the end product, and to keep in mind that log management systems typically normalize various data formats into a common schema. Rather than examining each type of log data in isolation, the end goal is to instead analyze a well orchestrated view of aggregate information across many different sources. Therefore, you should not only think about how a singular piece of log information is useful by itself, but also how it can enhance the usefulness of other information through correlation.
There's no need to go overboard here by hiring expensive data architects or database administration wizards. Simply think about how each component fits into the big picture and you'll be well on your way to a successful deployment.
With respect to log management system planning, one must take the overall volume of logs, as well as the geographical dispersion of systems into consideration. As mentioned earlier, log management systems are typically categorized into two different families: the basic log collector, and the SIEM.
However, these two classes are by no means mutually exclusive, and can in fact work in concert to build highly scalable systems capable of handling massive amounts of data from systems spread far and wide. Take a hypothetical company with a headquarter office located in Chicago and satellite offices in New York and California. Assuming each office generates a fair amount of system logs, one could deploy the potentially expensive commercial SIEM within the headquarters, yet strategically position free, open source log collectors/forwarders at the satellite offices. Within the California and New York offices, the chatty local traffic could be aggregated at the local server, which would then filter out noise and forward only important events upstream to the SIEM in Chicago. Rather than receiving logs from each and every server at the remote offices, the Chicago-based SIEM would only see events originating from two remote aggregation servers. This not only cuts down on extraneous network traffic, but may also reduce your license count dramatically.
SIEM solutions that natively support standard formats such as Syslog and Netflow are better equipped at fostering heterogeneous environments consisting of mixed open source and commercial components. Be on the lookout for vendor lock-in signs such as solutions that require proprietary agents to be installed on all systems, or systems that generally do not play well with open standards.

Reading the logs

Having examined the general benefits of log management systems as well as the planning methodology that goes into a successful log management system roll-out, one must take into consideration what resides at very heart of the system. I am of course referring to the logs themselves, and understanding their various formats and nuances is an integral factor in deciding which specific technologies to deploy. An in-depth analysis of specific log formats is well beyond the scope of this article, but suffice it to say certain log some formats are intended for human consumption, whereas others are more apt to machine parsing.
Formats such SNMP and Netflow are examples of highly structured data which are easily processed by software. On the other hand, system logs such as those generated by UNIX or Windows servers were historically designed for human evaluation rather than machine review. As such, they actually bare a closer resemblance to an email message rather than that of an event record. Much like email headers, Syslogs and Windows Event Logs have basic fields which convey only metadata such as the category, severity, and time of the event. The relevant information pertaining to the event itself is actually embedded within the "message" field of the record, which is analogous to the body of an email message. Just as there is there no standardize format for composing an email message, the placement of vital event information is often sporadic and comingled within other key data that really should be logically separated into their own discrete fields.
Coming full circle, this is where SIEM-type systems prove their worth through the data normalization process. That is, the intelligent parsing and transformation of loose data into structured information. Obviously, how well a given solution performs this task should be closely scrutinized during the product analysis phase.
Once the technological hurdles of a log management system have been addressed, the final stage of deployment is to compile a proper log management policy. Policies essentially define what to log, how the logs are recorded, and for how long logs are to be retained. Logging policies are frequently requested during times of legal action such as lawsuits or public records requests. Documenting what to log serves as the record of decision with respect to what is recorded versus that which is discarded.
Therefore, having language that clearly defines what is recorded and for how long it is retained can make the difference between efficient records requests and prolonged, time-draining depositions. Be aware that if records are requested from your organization, the requesting entity will most likely be using a completely different technology tool set. As such, it's imperative that copies of your original logs are kept in their native, unaltered state. If this isn't possible, then at the very least, logs should be easily exportable to a standardized format without loss of relevant information.
From the procedural perspective, log management policies should serve as a model for how logging is actually implemented across all enterprise systems. Areas of focus should include accurate time-keeping, log rotation and archival routines, as well as testing procedures to ensure the policies are upheld at all times.